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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW
I.

Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction to review an

order of the Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission")
concluding that the Commission has no jurisdiction over one-way
paging as a result of the failure of Industrial Communications to
seek review or rehearing by the Commissio|n.
II.

Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction to review a

rule of the Commission that the Commission has no jurisdiction
over one-way paging as a result of the failure of Industrial
Communications to seek review or rehearing by the Commission or a
determination in district court of the validity of the rule.
III.

Whether the Commission has jurisdiction over one-

way paging.
IV.

Whether the Commission acted appropriately in

adopting a rule that it has no jurisdiction over one-way paging.
V.

Whether the Commission's rule that it has no juris-

diction over one-way paging is constitutional.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The interpretation of the following statutes is determinative of the issues presented:

Sections 54-2-1(20)(a)f

54-2-1(30), 54-2-1(31), 54-4-1, 54-7-15, 54-7-16, 54-8b-l,
54-8b-2, 54-8b-3, 54-8b-9, 63-46a-l, 63-46a-2 and 63-46a-13.1

All statutory references in this brief will be to the 1986
replacement volumes of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 unless otherwise noted. The statutes referenced are set forth in Addendum A.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
NewVector Communications, Inc. ("NewVector") and The
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell")
sought leave to file a brief as amici curiae in this matter
because of their interest in the jurisdiction of the Commission
over providers of telecommunications services.

They are particu-

larly interested in the effect of the Public Telecommunications
Utility Law ("PTUL"), Section 54-8b-l et seq., on Commission
jurisdiction over such providers.

For reasons set forth below,

they support the Commission's conclusion that it does not have
jurisdiction over one-way paging.
After leave to file a brief amici curiae was granted and
while reviewing the record, it came to the attention of NewVector
and Mountain Bell that procedural irregularities exist which
appear to deprive the Court of jurisdiction to hear the consolidated cases.

NewVector and Mountain Bell would prefer to

have the Court reach and decide the substantive merits of the
jurisdictional issues.

However, as amici curiae, they believed

they were obligated to bring these procedural issues to the
Court's attention.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
Nature of the Case
These consolidated cases involve the Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging services and the propriety of its

adoption of a rule that it does not have such jurisdiction. The
cases are before the Court on petitions for writs of certiorari
filed by David R. Williams dba Industrial Communications
("Industrial Communications") seeking review of an order of the
Commission and a rule adopted by the Commission both to the
effect that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over oneway paging.
Proceedings and Disposition Below
On April 30, 1985, American Paging, Inc., of Utah
("American Paging") filed an application with the Commission in
Case No. 85-2007-01 for a certificate of convenience and
necessity authorizing it to provide one-way paging service to the
general public.

(R. 52-76)

Simultaneously, American Paging filed

a motion to dismiss its application because the Commission lacked
jurisdiction over paging.

(R. 77-79)

The motion was based on a

prior Commission order dismissing the application of Page America
of Utah, Inc. ("Page America") for a certificate to offer one-way
paging service and amending or voiding the certificates of Mobile
Telephone, Inc., Industrial Communications and Mobile Telephone
Service of Southern Utah, Inc. insofar as they granted authority
to offer paging service ("Page America ord^r").

(R. 77) The

basis of the Page America order was the Commission's conclusion

A copy of the Page America order is attached as Addendum B.

that one-way paging service was not within the scope of the definitions of "telephone corporation" and "telephone line,"
§§ 54-2-1(30), 54-2-1(31), thus, depriving the Commission of
jurisdiction to regulate paging.

(R. 80-94) American Paging's

motion was also based on the contention that the PTUL, enacted in
1985, did not expand the jurisdiction of the Commission.

(R. 78)

On March 28, 1985, Industrial Communications intervened
in Case No. 85-2007-01, protesting American Paging's application
and objecting to its motion to dismiss.

(R 123-24) On the same

day, Industrial Communications moved to stay proceedings on
American Paging's motion pending a decision on the appeal of the
Page America order. (R. 122)
On March 4, 1986, the Page America order was vacated in
Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah
1986), because the Commission did not comply with the requirements
of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act ("UARA"), Section
63-46a-l, et seq. 720 P.2d at 777.
On March 18, 1986, in Case No. 86-999-06, the Commission
proposed the following rule:

"The Public Service Commission of

Utah does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging services."
(R. 20) A copy of the proposed rule was given to counsel for
Industrial Communications on March 18, 1986 during a hearing in
Case No. 85-2007-01.

(R. 25) The proposed rule was filed with

the Office of Administrative Rules on March 25, 1986 as Rule No.

8304 (R. 20) and published in the Utah State Bulletin on April
15, 1986.

Industrial Communications took no action with respect

to the proposed rule until May 15, 1986, when it filed an objection to the proposed rule and requested a public hearing.
22-23) The Commission adopted Rule No. 8304 ("Rule")3
May 16, 1986.

(R.

effective

(R. 49-50)

On May 23, 1986, the Commission issued an order in Case
No. 85-2007-01 granting American Paging1^ motion to dismiss its
application for a certificate ("Order")/

(R. 235-37)

The Order

was based upon the Rule and upon the Commission's conclusion that
the PUTL did not expand its jurisdiction bo include one-way
paging.

(R. 237)
Industrial Communications did not file a petition for

review or rehearing by the Commission of »~he Rule or of the
Order or a declaratory judgment action with the district court
seeking to determine the validity of the Rule.

However, on June

13, 1986, it filed petitions for review of the Rule and of the
Order with this Court.

(R. 258-59, 265-6*SU

Statement of Facts
No evidence was taken by the Commission in Case No.
85-2007-01 on the Order or Case No. 86-999-06 on the Rule.
However, the Commission did take evidence in Case No. 83-082-01

A copy of the Rule is attached as Addendum C.
A copy of the Order is attached as Adaendum D.

before issuing the Page America order.

Based upon that evidence,

the Commission made the following findings of fact:
2. Both of the protestants currently hold
certificates of convenience and necessity from
this Commission authorizing them to provide
mobile radio-telephone service in various parts
of the state, and in conjunction therewith to
operate paging service as well. The grants of
authority have been made at various times, and
with a single exception have provided for
authority to operate both mobile telephone and
paging service. In 1974, the Commission issued
a certificate to Mobile Telephone Service of
Southern Utah, Inc. (which corporation is not
a Protestant in this case) in Case No. 6969
which dealt exclusively with the provision of
paging service, and the Protestants cite that
case to the Commission as determinative that
the Commission has already decided the jurisdictional issue herein. In one case, to be
discussed hereafter, the Commission did assert
jurisdiction over such service, but that case
was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court, and in
view of the Court's disposition of the same, we
do not consider ourselves bound by it. As we
will discuss hereafter, we do not believe that
the Supreme Court has ruled in respect to the
Commission's jurisdiction over paging services.
3. Paging technology has been developing
extremely rapidly over the past ten to fifteen
years. Prior to that time, substantially the
only method people had of ensuring that they be
apprised of all calls when they were away from
the phone, was to employ an answering service.
The calling party would leave a message with
the answering service, to be relayed when the
customer of the answering service phoned in to
get the messages. There was no way to let the
customer know immediately when a message had
been left.
*

*

*

7. Despite the rapid advances in the
technology, and the potential for greater usefulness, the essential structure of the service

remains the same, A caller uses the telephone
system to reach the service and leave a message.
The message is stored* There is then a retransmission, either to alert the customer that there
is a message, or to send it directly for voice
or display. The retransmission may or may not
involve use of the land lines. The service
requires, by way of equipment, some means of
answering the calls, storing the messages,
transmitting the alert signal, and replaying
the stored message. The only part which must
be done electronically is the transmission of
the alert signal. Obviously, a manual system
for the other part of the operation would be
intolerably cumbersome, and hence automated
equipment to handle these aspects has been
available for some time. Although this renders
the establishment of such a system expensive,
nevertheless, if one compares the capital of
such an operation with that required for a land
line telephone system, or similar fixed utility,
they are relatively modest. Furthermore, the
operation of such a system does not involve the
installation and maintenance of a wide-spread,
expensive physical distribution System.
8. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has allocated two primary bands for paging
service. One, commonly known as the "high
band", lies around 900 MHz. "Low band" lies
around 35 and 43 MHz. The FCC has recently
allocated 68 additional channels for the "high
band" and 28 channels in the "lovf band". Between them, the two bands have had only eight
channels heretofore. The FCC ha^ also considerably liberalized its criteria for granting
new licenses on these bands.
9. In the wake of the FCC allocation of
additional channels, and relaxation of licensing
requirements, there has been a perceptible trend
in a number of states toward relaxing regulation
of paging services, or deregulating them altogether.
(R. 81-82, 84-85)
NewVector and Mountain Bell do not believe these facts
are controverted in these consolidated appeals and believe such
facts were the basis for the Rule and Order.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
NewVector and Mountain Bell submit:

first, that the

Court lacks jurisdiction over these cases because Industrial
Communications failed to comply with statutory prerequisites for
appellate review; second, that the Commission does not have
jurisdiction over paging services; and third, that the Commission's
promulgation of the Rule defining its jurisdiction was appropriate
and constitutional •
The Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Order because
Industrial Communications failed to seek rehearing or review of
the Order by the Commission.

Section 54-7-15 makes it mandatory

for a party aggrieved by an order of the Commission to seek
Commission review or rehearing before resorting to the courts.
Industrial Communications' failure to apply for review or
rehearing within 20 days after the issuance of the Order bars it
from seeking judicial review of the Order.
The Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Rule either
because Industrial Communications failed to seek review or
rehearing of the Rule by the Commission or because Industrial
Communications has not sought to have the validity of the Rule
determined in a declaratory judgment action in district court.
If the Rule constitutes an order or decision of the Commission
under Sections 54-7-15 and 54-7-16, this Court is the only court
authorized to review the Rule.

However, in that case, Industrial

Communications would be required to seek review or rehearing of
the Rule by the Commission before resorting to review by this

Court*

Having failed to do so within 20 days of the issuance of

the Rulef Industrial Communications is barred from challenging
the Rule.

If, on the other hand, the Rule is not an order or

decision of the Commission, Section 63-4£a~13 provides that
Industrial Communications' remedy, if it disagrees with the Rule,
is to bring a declaratory judgment action in district court to
determine the validity of the Rule.
The Rule and Order were within the authority of the
Commission because the Commission does not have jurisdiction
over paging under Chapter 2 of Title 54.

In reviewing the

Commission's jurisdiction, the Court should interpret the statutes
strictly and accord deference to the Commission's interpretation
of the statutes under which it operates, particularly insofar as
such interpretation eases regulation in an increasingly competitive telecommunications environment.
the Commission's jurisdiction.

The PTUL did not expand

Moreover, the fact that the

Commission incorrectly and inadvertently regulated paging services for many years without statutory authority does not confer
jurisdiction on the Commission.

The Commission's jurisdiction is

granted by statute and may not be enlarged by erroneous
Commission action.
The Commission's adoption of the Rule, which essentially
amounts to its interpretation that one-way paging service is not
a public utility service under Chapter 2 o£ Title 54 of the Utah
Code Annotated 1953, was appropriate in light of the Commission's
inadvertent regulation of one-way paging for many years.

In

adopting the Rule, the Commission fully complied with the provisions of the UARA.

Rulemaking was consistent with the UARA

because the determination applies to a general class of persons
and implements and interprets statutory policy.

Rulemaking was

also consistent with the Court's holding in Williams v, Public
Service Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986).
The Rule does not deprive Industrial Communications of
its property for a public use without just compensation.

There-

fore, it complies with constitutional requirements.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
TO REVIEW THE ORDER
Industrial Communications did not seek review or
rehearing of the Order by the Commission prior to seeking review
in this Court.

That omission deprives the Court of jurisdiction

to review the Order.
Sections 54-7-15 and 54-7-16 set forth the requirements
for review of a Commission order by the courts.

Section 54-7-15

states:
Before any party . . . who is dissatisfied
with an order or decision of the commission
may commence legal action, the aggrieved party
or person shall first proceed as provided in
this section.
(1) After any order or decision has been
made by the commission any party to the
action or proceeding . . . may apply for
review or rehearing in respect to any

matters determined in said action or proceeding specified in the application.
The applicant shall make application to
the commission for review or rehearing
within 20 days after the ijssuance date of
the order or decision. The application
shall set forth specifically the grounds
on which the applicant considers such
decision or order to be unlawful. No
applicant shall, in any court, urge or
rely on any ground not set forth in the
application . . . .
Section 54-7-16 provides:
Within thirty days after tljie application for a rehearing is denied, or, if the
application is granted, within tihirty days
after the rendition of the decision on
rehearing, the applicant or any party to the
proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such
order or decision rendered upon rehearing may
apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having the
lawfulness of the original order or decision,
or the order or decision on rehearing,
inquired into and determined . . . .
No court
of this state (except the Supreme Court to the
extent herein specified) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any
order or decision of the commission . . . .
In the present proceeding, Industrial Communications did
not apply for review or rehearing before t}he Commission within
20 days of the date of the Order.

In Utah Department of Business

Regulation v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 602 P.2d 696
(Utah 1979), the Court held that failure olf a party to apply for
rehearing with the Commission within the time established by
Section 54-7-15 deprived the Court of jurisdiction over the
dispute.

Id. at 699.

It is clear from both Utah cases and the plain language
of the statute that Commission rehearing is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to appellate review.

Therefore, Case No. 860313

dealing with review of the Order must be dismissed.
II.
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
TO REVIEW THE RULE
The Rule is either a decision of the Commission under
Sections 54-7-15 and 54-7-16 or it is not.

If the Rule is deemed

a decision of the Commission, Section 54-7-15 requires Industrial
Communications to seek review or rehearing by the Commission
before seeking review by the Court.

If the Rule is not deemed a

decision, Section 63-46a-13 provides that its validity is to be
determined in a declaratory judgment action in the district
court.

Thus, whether the Rule is a decision or not/ Industrial

Communications1 failure to apply for review or rehearing by the
Commission or to seek a declaratory judgment in district court
deprives the Court of jurisdiction to review the Rule.
The Utah Code provides only two ways to obtain review of
Commission actions.

As discussed in Point I, if a Commission

action is characterized as an order or decision, it may be
reviewed only after timely application for review or rehearing by
the Commission and then only by the Supreme Court.
54-7-16.

§§ 54-7-15,

If the action is characterized as a rule, as opposed to

an order or decision, Section 63-46a-13(l) provides that:

The validity or applicability of a rule may
be determined in an action for declaratory
judgment in any district court of this state
with appropriate venue, if it is alleged that
the rule, or its potential application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or
privileges of the plaintiff.
This section derives from Section 7 of the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act.

Washington also adopted this sec-

tion with some modifications, the most significant of which was
that, instead of permitting the action to be brought "in any
district court of this state with appropriate venue," Washington's
statute provides that the action must be brought in "the Superior
Court of Thurston County."

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 34.04.070(1)

(1986).
In Sim v. Washington State Parks and Recreation
Commission, 90 Wash.2d 378, 538 P.2d 1193 (1978), the Washington
Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word "may" as used in
the statute.

Sim brought an action in a court other than the

Superior Court of Thurston County to enjoin the agency from
enforcing a regulation.

The agency attempted to have the matter

dismissed for improper venue.

Sim contended that the matter was

not an action for declaratory judgment and, therefore, need not
be brought in Thurston County.

The lower I court ruled in favor of

Sim on the ground that Section 34.04.070 did not provide exclusive venue because the statute was merely permissive.
the Washington Supreme Court reversed.

On appeal,

It} held that the nature

of the action was one for declaratory relief regardless of the
fact that Sim styled it as an injunctive action.

On the question

whether Section 34.04,070 was permissive, the court said:
In our view the use of the word "may" in this
statute operates to grant permission to bring
the pertinent petition in a certain form. The
form is that of a declaratory judgment. If a
party chooses to bring a declaratory judgment
petition challenging the validity of a state
agency rule, the statute provides only one
place in which to file it: Thurston County.
Thus, the provision for venue is clearly
exclusive unless, under some other statutory
provision, the legislature has authorized
venue elsewhere.
583 P.2d at 1195.
Here, as in Sim, the use of the word "may" in Section
63-46a-13 does not give Industrial Communications the option of
commencing an action on the Rule in district court or of seeking
review of the Rule in this Court.

Rather, it gives Industrial

Communications permission to test the validity of the Rule in an
action for declaratory judgment in an appropriate district court
should it choose to do so.
The conclusion is inescapable that Industrial
Communications was required to comply either with Sections
54-7-15 and 54-7-16 or Section 63-46a-13.
comply with either.

It has failed to

Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to

review the Rule.
III.
THE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE
JURISIDICTION OVER PAGING
Industrial Communications essentially argues that the
Order and Rule are invalid because they amount to a deregulation

of paging without compliance with the requirements of the Public
Telecommunications Utility Law ("PTUL").

The Commission cannot

and need not exempt paging from regulation under PTUL unless it
has jurisdiction over it.

Therefore, the premise of Industrial

Communications' argument is that the Commission has jurisdiction
over paging.

NewVector and Mountain Bell disagree with that fun-

damental premise.
A«

The Commission's Jurisdiction Should Be Strictly Construed•
The Commission's power of regulation is a delegation

of legislative authority.

Because that delegation imposes

regulatory burdens on certain businesses that are not imposed on
businesses generallyf it should be strictly construed.
In Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Commission of
Utah, 531 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975), the Court considered whether a
nonscheduled airline was a public utility subject to regulation
by the Commission.

Before reviewing the definition of "common

carrier" in Section 54-2-1, the Court observed that
the rule is fundamental that restraints or
duties imposed by law must be clear and unequivocal .
In harmony with this, it is well established
that a regulatory body such as the Public
Service Commission, which is created by and
derives its powers and duties from statute,
has no inherent regulatory powers, but only
those which are expressly granted, or which
are clearly implied as necessary to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities
imposed upon it.

531 P.2d at 1305. Consistent with this philosophy of regulatory
restraint, the Court held that because Section 54-2-1(8)(d)
included the word "scheduled/" a nonscheduled airline was not a
public utility and not subject to regulation.
The principle of strict construction of definitional
requirements for public utilities has also been followed in other
cases.

In Medic-Call/ Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Utah/

24 Utah 2d 273f 470 P.2d 258 (1970)/ the Court held that a paging
service whose users were limited to subscribing physicians was
not a public utility because it was not available to the public
generally as required by Section 54-2-1(20).

Similarly/ in

Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center/ Inc. v. Public Service Commission/ 558 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1977), the Court held that a shopping
center that produced and distributed electricity entirely within
private property which was sold only to its tenants was not a
public utility.
In

Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. Formal

Complaint of WWZ Co.f 641 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1982)/ the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that a private sewage disposal company was not
subject to regulation of the Wyoming commission.

The court said:

Section 54-2-1(8)(d) was previously part of Section 54-2-1(14)
in Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6Af 1974).
6

Section 54-2-1(20) was previously Section 54-2-1(30) in Utah
Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6Ar 1974).

[T]he statutes creating and empowering the PSC
must be strictly construed and any reasonable
doubt of the existence of any power must be
resolved against the exercise thereof.
[Citation omitted*]
Id. at 186.
B#

The Commission Has Strictly Interpreted Its Jurisdiction
Section 54-4-1 grants the Commission authority "to

supervise and regulate every public utility in this state • . . ."
Section 54-2-1(20)(a) defines public utility for purposes relevant to this appeal as "every . . . telephone corporation . . .
where the service is performed for . . . the public generally
. . . ."

Section 54-2-1(30) defines telephone corporation as

"every corporation and person . . . owningf controlling,
operating, or managing any telephone line for public service
within this state . . . ."

Finally, Section 54-2-1(31) provides

that
"Telephone line" includes all conduits,
ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and
appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled,
operated, or managed in connection with or to
facilitate communication by telephone whether
that communication is had with or without the
use of transmission wires.
In interpreting the key definition of "telephone line"
in the Page America order, the Commission said:
5. The distinction between paging and
telephone service is critical because if in
defining "telephone line" one focuses on the
phrase "facilitate telephone communication,"
the scope of potentially regulated services

becomes staggering. Conceivably the
Commission should then regulate all suppliers
of telephone equipment/ e.g. Radio Shack,
Sears, J* C. Penney, Panasonic; suppliers of
wiring components; all suppliers of telephone
directories, including the many not affiliated
with the Bell system; telephone answering services, telephone answering devices and all
such suppliers; radio talk stations; newspaper
classified advertising, aci absurdum. The
focus instead should be on the connotation of
telephone service which implies interactive,
and at least potentially extended two-way communication* That was certainly the focus in
1917 when the statute was enacted, since most
of the services now technologically feasible
were not foreseen at that time. Paging service is conceptually no different from
answering services (which have never been
considered appropriate objects of state
regulation); it is the same service offered
through a different medium. Telephone service
over land lines or radio waves is fundamentally the same service irrespective of the
means of transmission. But telephone service
is a two-way service; paging service is one-way
call notification,
6. Finally, we consider it appropriate
to evaluate paging service in the context of
the traditional characteristics which have
warranted granting of a state-regulated monopoly. Historically, legislatures have
narrowly circumscribed the conditions which
justify such a departure from a free market
economy. Those conditions have generally
included the providing of a service which is
deemed necessary and essential to the citizenry, the existence of natural monopolies
because of significant capital investment
necessary to achieve economies of scale in production, and the efficient use of minimally
intrusive riqhts of way across land. An
objective analysis of paging service persuades
us to conclude the following:
(a) Paging is a valuable convenience for a small but growing number of
people. Industrial presented information to

the effect that it has the capacity to serve
200,000 paging subscribers, but presently serves approximately 2,500 subscribers. While
paging is beneficial and efficient in aiding
instant response to telephone calls, we cannot
say that the service is a necessary public
service in the sense that water, electricity,
natural gas and basic telephone service are
necessary to the well-being of the citizenry,
nor can it be said that a significant number
of telephone customers avail themselves of the
service•
(b) The capital necessary to provide paging service is not substantial compared to the capital commitments common to
other utility services.
(c) The public is not inconvenienced by the plant or transmission of
paging signals in the way it would be inconvenienced by unlimited electric companies
seeking transmission rights of way. Whether
there are three or three hundred paging companies, the intrusion upon land would be
minimal.
(d) Paging may have been a service
in short supply because the FCC imposed severe
limits to market entry by restricting frequencies within the RF spectrum; however, the FCC
decision to release 96 new frequencies significantly alters the supply consideration and
represents a major federal policy to liberalize market access and foster competition in
the paging industry.
(e) If competition can produce service and price benefits to paging customers,
there would appear to be no substantial reason
for this Commission to exercise jurisdiction.
Certainly there would be obvious advantages to
the Protestants if market entry were
restricted, but the purpose of state regulation isn't to protect the interests of regulated companies for their own sake; it is to
protect the public interest. Conceivably,
there will be many market entrants, and it is

likely that some will flourish and some will
fail. We see no significant risk to the
public if some providers failf and we are
persuaded that the open market will in time be
the best safeguard of the public interest,
both in terms of price and service.
(f) The Protestants urge the
Commission to assert jurisdiction to preclude
duplication of facilities, but duplication is
the essence of competition, and such a policy
would be rational only if the investment
necessary to launch a paging service were
vastly greater than it is.
The Commission's interpretation of the definition of
"telephone line" to focus on two-way communication is consistent
with the policy of regulatory restraint and avoids the absurd
extension of jurisdiction that would be compelled by a broad
reading of the definition.

Statutes are not to be interpreted in

a manner that produces absurd consequences.

Curtis v. Harmon

Electronics, Inc. , 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978).
C.

The Commission's Interpretation of Its Jurisdiction Should
Be Accorded Deference by the CourtT
The interpretation by an administrative agency of the

statutes under which it operates, although not binding, is to be
accorded deference by a reviewing court.

In Utah Department of

Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d
601 (Utah 1983), the Court considered the standard of review of
various types of decisions by the Commission.

With respect to

Commission interpretation "of the operative provisions of the
statutory law it is empowered to administer," the Court said:
In reviewing agency decisions of this type, we
apply what we have called the "time honored
rule of law . • • that the construction of
statutes by governmental agencies charged with

their administration should be given considerable weight . . . ." An agency's interpretation of key provisions of the statute it
is empowered to administer is often inseparable
from its application of the rules of law to the
basic facts, discussed above. In reviewing
decisions such as these, a court should afford
great deference to the technical expertise or
more extensive experience of the responsible
agency. But, on issues of special law, as with
other issues under this heading, the decision of
the Commission is subject to judicial review
under the standard elucidated here.
The degree of deference extended to the
decisions of the Commission on these issues
. . . [is] that the Commission's decision must
fall within the limits of reasonableness or
rationality. [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 610.
In

Big K Corporation v. Public Service Commission of

Utah, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984), the Court appears to have
moderated this standard somewhat, noting that
Even with respect to the Commission's
construction of its organic statute, we do not
defer unless the Commission by virtue of
expertise and experience with the regulatory
scheme is in a superior position to give
effect to the regulatory objectives to be
achieved . . . .
Id. at 1353.
Even assuming that the Big K standard does accord less
deference to Commission interpretation of its jurisdiction than
Department of Administrative Services, the standard of review
to be applied in this case is still one of deference to the
Commission.

Here, the Commission has interpreted its jurisdic-

tion over one segment of the telecommunications industry in light

of the significant technological and federal regulatory developments in that segment and in the industry in general. The
Commission has concluded that a broad reading of the definition
of telephone corporation to include paging would lead to absurd
consequences with respect to other segments of the telecommunications industry.

That conclusion is clearly based on the

Commission's experience and expertise in dealing with the
increasingly competitive telecommunications industry and with the
accomplishment of regulatory objectives in the new environment.
Even prior to the breakup of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company ("AT&T") pursuant to United States v. American
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) f
aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983),
significant competition was developing in traditionally regulated
services.

In 1968f the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")

opened the customer equipment sector of the industry to competition as the result of the availability of competitive equipment.

Use of Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, reconsideration

denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
In 1971, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
determined that
a general policy in favor of entry of new
carriers in the specialized communications
field would serve the public interest, convenience and necessity . . . .
•

*

*

[I]t is not necessary or desirable in the
public interest to hold comparative hearings

for the purpose of restricting new entry in
any particular area to only one private line
applicant.
Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 920, 926
(1971), aff' d sub nom., Washington Utilities & Transportation
Commission v. Federal Communications Commission, 513 F.2d 1142
(9th Cir.), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
Requirements and restrictions imposed on former members
of the Bell system by the Plan of Reorganization adopted pursuant
to U.S. v. AT&T and approved in United States v. Wetern Electric
Co., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom., California
v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983), have resulted in further
competition in telecommunications.

Economists have begun to

question whether modern technology has not rendered the natural
monopoly rationale for regulation otiose.

Stelzer, A Policy

Guide for Utility Executives: "Know When to Hold'Em; Know When
to Fold1Em," Pub. Util. Fort., Oct. 9, 1980, at 62.
All public utilities tend to pass through four stages of
development.

In the first stage, the technology is developed,

and monopoly status may be desirable because of the narrow market
available.

In the second stage, the public utility seeks regula-

tion in order to stabilize its growth and establish legitimacy.
In the third stage, utilities tend to encounter competitive
pressure as a result of new technological breakthroughs, and
encourage regulation in order to preserve monopoly status.

In

the fourth stage, they yield to competitive pressures and seek to
return to a conventional competitive market.

Wilcox and Shepherd,

Public Policies Toward Business, 348-49 (5th Ed. 1975)

The tele-

communications industry in general, and paging in particular, is
clearly in a transition between the third and fourth stages.
The purpose for regulation of public utilities is to
serve as a substitute for free market competition.

In Utah Gas

Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d
530 (1967), the Court described this overriding regulatory objective as follows:
[D]uplication of facilities would be so wasteful and impractical that the law provides for
the granting of monopolistic franchises, as a
consequence of which such utilities are deemed
to submit to regulation by public authority,
which in a measure, substitutes for the
controls usually imposed upon business by free
competition.
422 P.2d at 532-33.

Professor Alfred Kahn confirmed this point

when he said:
The essence of regulation is the explicit
replacement of competition with governmental
orders as the principal institutional device
for assuring good performance.
1 Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, 20 (1970).
This principle applies with equal force to a market in
which the number of participants is severely limited by economic
factors such as significant barriers to entry or dominant economies
of scale as it does to a pure monopoly.
As noted in the statement of facts, there has been a
tremendous increase in availability of radio channels for paging,
the capital investment required to enter the paging market is
relatively insignificant, duplication of facilities does not

impose undue burdens on public rights-of-way and paging is a
luxury used by only a relatively small segment of the public.

In

addition to making numerous new radio channels available for
paging, the FCC has recently issued an order preempting state
regulation which has the effect of prohibiting or impeding entry
7
into paging or two-way mobile services.
In this context and
based upon its expertise and experience, the strict interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes by the Commission should be
accorded deference by the Court because it is consistent with the
objectives of regulation.

The recent history of the telecom-

munications industry is one of increasing competition and
decreasing need for regulation.
D«

The Commission's Interpretation Does Not Confict with
Precedent
The Commission's construction of Section 54-2-1(31) to

exclude one-way paging from its jurisdiction does not conflict
with any prior interpretation of that section.
In Medic-Call, the Court "did not reach the issue of
whether publicly available paging service . . . would be a public
utility . . . ."

Williams, 720 P.2d at 777 n. 9.

To the

contrary, language of the Court implied that problems would arise

In the Matter of Preemption of State Entry Regulation in the
Public Land Mobile Service, 59 P&F Rad. Reg. 1518 (Rel. Mar. 31,
1986) (CC Dkt. 85-89, RM-4811). This order has been stayed
pending appeal.

from including paging within the definition of public utility.
The Court said:
The service is comparable to that which
would be rendered by runners or call boys to
notify doctors that they were wanted on the
phone. One wonders just how the defendant
would go about regulating the service even if
it had the power to do so.
If defendants can regulate the service rendered by plaintiffs herein, could they not
with equal propriety regulate the semaphore
signaling of the boy scouts or the smoke
signals of the Indians on a hunting expedition?
Medic-Call, 470 P.2d at 260.
In Williams v, Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684
(Utah 1979), the Court considered the definition of telephone
line in determining if Industrial Communications was a public
utility with the power of eminent domain.

While the Court noted

that Industrial Communications offered paging, it focused on
radio-telephone or mobile telephone communications in holding
that "telephone line" should be interpreted liberally to include
such service.
E.

Id. at 686-87.

The PTUL Did Not Expand the Commission's Jurisdiction.
In enacting the PTUL, the Legislature vested the Com-

mission with authority partially or wholly to exempt telecommunications corporations or services from some or all of the
regulatory requirements of Title 54.

§ 54-8b-3.

It also

approved competitive negotiations by telecommunications corporations for services subject to Commission approval.

§ 54-8b-4.

For purposes of the PTUL, the Legislature adopted broad definitions of "public telecommunications services" and "telecommunications corporation."

§ 54-8b-2.

However, in Section 54-8b-9, it

specifically provided that
Nothing is this chapter shall be construed
to enlarge or reduce the commission's jurisdiction over the services and entities for
which jurisdiction is provided or excluded by
other provisions of this title.
Industrial Communications argues that the PTUL expands
Commission jurisdiction because the definitions of "telecommunications corporation" and "public telecommunications services" in
it are broader than those of "telephone line" and "telephone corporation" in Chapter 2 of Title 54 and because the PTUL act was
entitled:
AN ACT RELATING TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; CLARIFYING THE AUTHORITY OF THE
PSC TO REGULATE INTRASTATE PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES; AND PROVIDING A METHOD OF
EXEMPTING CERTAIN SERVICES FROM REGULATION.
1985 Utah Laws, ch. 257.

On the basis of these definitions and

the title, Industrial Communications argues that the Legislature
intended to make it clear that paging service was within the
Commission's jurisdiction in enacting the PTUL.
Even assuming Industrial Communications is correct about
legislative intent, its argument must fail because the PTUL is not
subject to construction —

it is clear and unambiguous.

Further-

more, even if some ambiguity is deemed created by the PTUL, it

must be resolved in favor of the Commission's more restrictive
interpretation of its jurisdiction under principles of statutory
construction,
I.

The Court May Look to Legislative Intent Only If
the Statute Is Ambiguous,

Even assuming the title and definitions of the PTUL
might be deemed to indicate a legislative intent to redefine
Commission jurisdiction, the Court cannot embark upon a consideration of legislative intent unless it determines that the
PTUL is ambiguous.

The Court does not have authority to construe

an act which is clear on its face, even if the act is inconsistent with a clear legislative intent.
In State v, Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Utah 1974), the
defendant was charged with aggravated assault under Section
76-5-103 (Supp. 1973),

Unfortunately, in enacting Section

76-5-103, which provided for the crime of aggravated assault, an
error in referencing a definitional section was made.

The Court,

recognizing the obvious statutory error, nonetheless dismissed
the charge stating:
There is nothing ambiguous about the statute in the instant matter; it simply does not
state a crime, and we are not empowered to
state one for the legislators simply because
it seems certain that they intended to state
one themselves,
526 P.2d at 912.
In Utah State Democratic Committee v. Monson, 652 P.2d
890 (Utah 1982), the Court affirmed that "there is nothing to

construe when there is no ambiguity in a statute."
893.

See also H

•L

652 P.2d at

v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907f 913 (Utah

1979).
2.

The PTUL Is Not Ambiguous.

The definitions of "telecommunications corporation" and
"public telecommunications services" in Section 54-8b-2 are
restricted in their application solely to the PTUL.

The fact

that a larger universe of entities and services could be exempted
from regulation under the PTUL than were subject to regulation
under the balance of Title 54 does not create an ambiguity in the
PTUL.

No damage results if the Commission exempts from regula-

tion an entity or service which it has no jurisdiction to regulate.

Damage results only if the Commission regulates entities

or services which it has no jurisdiction to regulate or fails to
regulate entities or services which it should regulate.

The PTUL

deals with exemption, not regulation.
With regard to the possible ambiguity created by the
clarification language in the title of the PTUL act, it is well
established that the title of an act is relevant in its construction only if there is some ambiguity in the act itself.

The

title of an act is not a part of the act and cannot modify the
express terms of the act.

American Electric Power Service Corp.

v. State, 619 P.2d 314, 315 (Utah 1980); Great Salt Lake Authority

v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d, 963, 964-65,
reh. 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504, 505 (1966); American Smelting
& Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 147, 397 P.2d
67, 70 (1964).
In American Electric Power Service Corp., the title of
an act indicated that the Legislature intended to amend a section
of the code on licensing.

However, the body of the act,

apparently by mistake, amended a section of the code on safety.
The Court said:
resort cannot be had to the title of an act
for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the
statute so as to include a subject not fairly
expressed in the body of the act.
619 P.2d at 315.

In Great Salt Lake Authority, the Court refused

to look to the title of the act in question, which clarified its
application, even though it held the act invalid because of
uncertainty in its application.

421 P.2d at 505.

There is no reference in the PTUL to any clarification
of the authority of the Commission.
in the title of the act.

That reference is found only

1985 Utah Laws, ch. 257.

To the

contrary, the body of the act expresses an unambiguous legislative intent to leave the Commission's jurisdiction as it was
prior to the act.

§ 54-8b-9.

In any event, there may be no ambiguity created by the
title.

In the context of Section 54-8b-9, it is reasonable to

assume that the express granting of authority to exempt entities
from regulation, which is a new concept in Title 54, was the
jurisdictional clarification intended by the Legislature.

It

would have been simple enough for the Legislature to amend
Section 54-2-1(30) by substituting Section 54-8b-2(2) and (3),
Section 54-2-1(31) by substituting Section 54-8b-2(4) and Section
54-2-1(20) by substituting "telecommunications" for "telephone"
had it intended to broaden the definition of "public utility"
with respect to telecommunications services.
3*

The Commission's Interpretation of Its Jurisdiction
Is Correct Even Assuming the PTUL Creates Ambiguity*

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the PTUL
creates ambiguity, such ambiguity arises only in the context of
the balance of Title 54 and not within the PTUL itself.

Section

54-8b-2 defines telecommunications corporation and services more
broadly than Sections 54-2-1(30) and 54-2-1(31) define telephone
corporation and line.

Assuming there is some ambiguity created

by these different definitions, the more restrictive definitions
of Sections 54-2-1(30) and 54-2-1(31) control under principles of
statutory construction.
First, the rule of regulatory restraint enunciated in
Basin Flying Service, compels a restrictive construction of the
statutes.

531 P.2d at 1305.

If there is ambiguity, there is

doubt, and the doubt should be resolved in favor of Chapter 2's
more restrictive definitions.

Second, a reading of the entire Title together,
attempting to give effect to all of its parts, Great Salt Lake
Authority, 414 P.2d at 964, indicates that the principal function
of the PTUL was to provide a means to exempt some aspects of the
telecommunications business from regulation.

The broader uni-

verse defined in the PTUL which is clearly restricted in its
application solely to Chapter 8b, should, therefore, be construed
as being limited, by implication, to the universe of entities
already subject to jurisdiction under the definitions in Chapter
2 which are applicable to the entirety of Title 54.
Third, even absent a policy of regulatory restraint,
specific provisions such as the definitions in Chapter 2 prevail
over more general expressions such as the definitions in the PTUL.
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980).
Fourth, in enacting a new statute, the Legislature is
presumed to be aware of previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter.

Absent express repeal or amendment, it is pre-

sumed that the new act was enacted consistent with the prior act
and that no implied repeal or amendment was intended unless the
statutes are irreconcilable.

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314

(Utah 1983); State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 335-36 (Utah 1980).
Section 54-8b-9 makes it absolutely clear that Section 54-8b-2
was not intended to amend or repeal Sections 54-2-1(30) or (31)
by implication or otherwise.

F.

Prior Regulation of One-Way Paging Does Not Confer
Jurisdiction on the Commission
Industrial Communications contends that the Commission's

regulation of one-way paging for many years precludes it from
issuing the Order and adopting the Rule.
prevail.

Such an argument cannot

Otherwise, the Commission could endow itself with

authority through erroneous statutory interpretation.
In Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24,
151 P.2d 467 (1944), the Court considered whether an agreement
between the hotel and the Industrial Commission regarding contributions to the unemployment compensation fund for performing
bands and specialty acts precluded the commission from adopting a
contrary interpretation of the statute.

The Court held that the

commission was not so precluded, reasoning that:
The Commission had the authority to interpret
the Act, for such is a necessary condition
precedent to its administration, but such
interpretation was not binding. . . .
The point involved in the settlement of the
earlier group of cases was whether, under Sec.
42-2a-19, the hotel company was an employer of
the orchestra members or not. In the
agreement the Commission concluded that "name
bands" and "speciality features" were not
within the statute. This was purely a
question of law and the erroneous interpretation of the statute by the Commission could
not have the effect of changing liability
under the statute nor of estopping the
Commission from later changing its interpretation.
In so holding, we appreciate the fact that
the hotel company is now in a position under
which it will be penalized for abiding by and

relying upon a regulation or interpretation of
the Department of Employment Security. This
interpretive agreement was, after all, promulgated by the state's own agency and the
individual who chooses to conform to it rather
than ignore it should not suffer from his law
abiding attitude even though he bases his
actions on an invalid regulation. Therefore,
as a general proposition we sympathize with
the view that an individual should not have to
run the risk of a change of administrative
interpretation which may result in a retroactive change in regulations to his disadvantage. Although, in view of these factors a
contrary result might seem to be a desirable
one when applied to the facts of this particular case, the consequences which will flow
from such a holding strike at the very heart
of the relationships between administrative
tribunals, the legislature and the courts.
Ijd. 151 P.2d at 470.
Here, the case is stronger because the Commission never
considered the interpretation of the definition of "telephone
line" as applied to paging until 1983.

It simply granted appli-

cations for certificates of convenience and necessity to render
paging service, usually in conjunction with mobile telephone service, without considering its jurisdiction.
Husky Oil Co. of Delaware v. State Tax Commission of
Utah, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976), does not undermine the holding
of Utah Hotel.

In Husky, the Tax Commission attempted to levy

use taxes on the purchase of a piece of equipment sold in an
occasional sale not in the normal course of the seller's business.

The Court held that the commission's position was contrary

to the correct interpretation of a statutory exemption for such

The discussion in Husky regarding the effect of a change
in regulation arose only because the commission argued that its
recent adoption of a new regulation should govern the interpretation of the statute.

In responding to that argumentf the Court

first noted that on two occasions previously it had interpreted
the statute differently than the new regulation did and that the
new regulation was inconsistent with the language of the statute.
The Court then went on to note that a prior regulation of the
commission which had been in effect for 34 years and which was
consistent with the statute added weight to the Court's interpretation of the statute.
Husky clearly does not stand for the proposition that an
erroneous statutory interpretation will become binding simply
because it has gone unchallenged or uncorrected for many years.
Celebrity Clubf Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission,
602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), likewise does not detract from Utah
Hotel.

In Celebrity Club, the Court held that the Liquor Control

Commission was estopped to modify its determination that a private club was not located within 600 feet of a school where the
club's building had been relocated and constructed specifically
in reliance on that determination.

The Court also noted the

ambiguity of the statute in question and posed various reasonable
constructions of the statute and possible factual findings which
could have been made, but which were not considered by the commission, any of which would have allowed licensing of the club.
In discussing the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the Court

observed that it must be applied cautiously against the State and
only "if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of governmental powers will not be impaired." 602 P.2d at 694.
In Utah Hotely the hotel was required to make contributions to the unemployment compensation fund which it would not
have been required to make had the incorrect interpretation
of the statute not been corrected.

However, there was absolutely

no indication that the hotel would have conducted its affairs
differently had the Tax Commission never misinterpreted the statute.

To the contrary, the hotel regularly scheduled bands on

which it had to pay contributions even under the misinterpretation.

In Celebrity Club, a building was relocated and then

constructed specifically in reliance on the Liquor Control
Commission's interpretation of the statute.

Under the new

interpretation by the Commission, the building was rendered useless to the club and the investment was wasted.
Here, unlike Utah Hotel or Celebrity Club, the
Commission never interpreted the jurisdictional statutes until
the present controvery arose in 1983.

The implicit interpreta-

tion of the statute involved in granting an application for a
certificate to paging providers in the past is as much the
responsibility of those providers as it is of the Commission.
They applied for the certificates implying to the Commission that
it did have jurisdiction.

In all but one case, paging was only a

tag-along in their applications to mobile or other telephone service which is subject to regulation.

Furthermoref there is no reason to believe that Industrial
Communications would have conducted its affairs significantly
differently had the Commission addressed the issue many years
ago and determined that it had no jurisdiction over paging.
Industrial Communications still would have needed a certificate
to offer mobile telephone service and presumably would have
applied for one.

Its understanding of the exclusivity or mono-

poly power it would have enjoyed in paging service would not have
changed*

Industrial Communications was the third mobile

telephone provider certificated in the major Wasatch Front
markets and then only after the Court held that the two existing
providers had no right to be protected from competition.
Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utahf 29 Utah 2d 9, 504
P.2d 34, 37 (1972) .
Finally, Industrial Communications is not deprived of
the use of its paging facilities by the Order or Rule.

To the

contrary, it is free to use them without the burdens of regulation.
The fact that the Commission may have mistakenly and
inadvertently regulated paging services for several years does
not prevent the Commission from correcting its mistake under the
circumstances presented and cannot be deemed to amend the
legislative grant of authority to the Commission.

rv.
THE COMMISSION'S ADOPTION OF
THE RULE WAS APPROPRIATE
Given that the Commission had inadvertently and mistakenly regulated paging for several years, the question arises how
the Commission could correct its error.

In the Page America

order, it attempted to do so by entering an order after an evidentiary hearing concluding that it had no jurisdiction and
voiding the certificates erroneously issued previously to parties
that were before it in that case.

In Williams, 720 P.2d 773, the

Court held that the Page America order was not the appropriate
way to correct the error and stated that a rulemaking proceeding
would be.

Therefore, on remand, the Commission initiated a rule-

making proceeding and adopted a rule in compliance with the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act ("UARA").

Industrial Communications

not only challenges compliance with the UARAf but also goes
further in effect contending that the Commission could not
correct its error through a rulemaking proceeding.

NewVector and

Mountain Bell submit that the Commission complied with the UARA
and that rulemaking was the appropriate way to correct the error.
A#

The Commission Complied with the Requirements of the UARA«
The briefs of the Commission and American Paging

discuss compliance with the UARA at some length.

NewVector

and Mountain Bell agree with those arguments and do not believe
it is necessary to repeat them here.
comments.

They wish only to add two

First, with respect to the question of notice, publication of the proposed rule in the Utah State Bulletin would be
deemed to provide constructive notice to interested persons
whether they had actual notice or not under generally accepted
principles.

See Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill,

332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947).

Here, the Rule was published in the

Utah State Bulletin and Industrial Communications had actual
notice. (R. 20, 25)
Second, with respect to information required by Section
63-46a-4(3) to be included in the notice, NewVector and Mountain
Bell note that the items identified in the statute are the precise items specified in the Administrative Analysis Notice of
Proposed Rule form utilized by the Commission and delivered to
Industrial Communications.

(R. 20)

Therefore, Industrial

Communications1 claim that the necessary information was not
supplied is simply incorrect.
It is apparent that the Commission complied with the
UARA and that the Rule should not be invalidated for noncompliance.
B.

The Adoption of the Rule Was Appropriate.
The more serious contention raised by Industrial Communi-

cations is that the Rule is invalid because it is not an appropriate way to deregulate paging.

Industrial Communications

contends that exemption under the PTUL is the only way to deregulate a service which has previously been regulated.

NewVector

and Mountain Bell submit that this contention is incorrect
because the Commission does not have jurisdiction over paging and
the Rule is an interpretation of the statute affecting a general
class of persons.

It is also incorrect based upon the Court's

holding in Williams,
The premise of Industrial Communications1 argument that
paging could only be deregulated through an exemption proceeding
under the PTUL is that the Commission has jurisdiction over
paging.

As demonstrated in Point III, that premise is incorrect.

Furthermore, it must be noted that deregulation and exemption are
not the same thing.
cannot regulate.

Deregulation implies that the Commission

Exemption implies that the Commission may regu-

late but chooses not to for reasons specified in Section 54-8b-3.
Section 54-8b-7 makes absolutely clear the distinction between
deregulation and exemption in providing that the Commission
retains continuous jurisdiction over exempted services and may
revoke or modify the exemption at any time after notice and
hearing.
Section 63-46a-2(a) defines a rule as follows:
"Rule" means a statement made by an agency
that applies to a general class of persons
and: (i) implements or interprets policy made
by statute . . . .
The Rule clearly is a statement applicable to a general
class of persons which implements or interprets the definition of
public utility as applied to paging.
appropriate subject for rulemaking.

Therefore, it is an

In Williams , which is the law of the case insofar as the
Rule is concerned, the Court said:
Under all these circumstances, we conclude
that the Commission cannot reverse its longsettled position regarding the scope of its
jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy
change without following the requirements of
the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act. • • •
Because the requirements of the Act were not
satisfied, the rule is vacated and the matter
is remanded for further proceedings.
720 P.2d at 777.
The rule referred to in Williams was the June 3, 1983
letter from the Commission to American Paging informally interpreting the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction not to include
one-way paging.

720 P.2d at 774.

That letter was admittedly

adopted without compliance with the UARA.

Here, the Rule was

adopted strictly in compliance with the UARA and at the invitation of the Williams Court.

Industrial Communications' effort to

fault the Commission for following the Court's direction in
Williams is inexplicable and unpersuasive.
Adoption of the Rule was an appropriate way to let the
world know that persons proposing to offer one-way paging service
in Utah need not apply for certificates or submit to regulation
of the Commission.

It was also an appropriate way to let

existing providers know that they are free to compete in the
market without the necessity of filing tariffs every time they
wish to change prices or terms of service.

V.
THE RULE IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Industrial Communications makes the novel argument that
the Rule, by declaring that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to regulate paging, is an unconstitutional taking because
it deprives Industrial Communications and other certificate
holders of their valuable certificates without compensation.

The

briefs of the Commission and American Paging adequately point out
the fallacies of that argument*

NewVector and Mountain Bell wish

only to add two comments.
First, these parties are unaware of any public utility
case in which it has been argued, let alone held, that removal of
regulation is a deprivation of property.

Cases that recognize

the proper constitutional limitations on regulation are concerned
with the interference that regulation imposes on the use and
enjoyment of private property.

See e.g. State of Missouri ex

rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission
of Missouri, 262 U.S. 281 (1923); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944).
Second, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution are limited in their application to takings for
public use.

Industrial Communications' certificate has not been

taken for public use; it has been voided prospectively.
unconstitutional taking has occurred.

No

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that these cases should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Industrial Communications failed to seek review or rehearing by the Commission and
failed to test the validity of the Rule in a declaratory judgment
action in district court.

If the Court determines that it has

jurisdiction to review the Order and Rulef it is respectfully
submitted that the Order and Rule should be affirmed because the
Commission does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging and
because adoption of the Rule was an appropriate method to correct
the Commission's prior inadvertent and erroneous regulation of
paging.
DATED this 1st day of December, 1986.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
STATUTES1
54-2-1.

Terms defined —
regulation*

Utilities subject to jurisdiction and

When used in this title:
*

*

*

(20)(a) "Public utility" includes every common carrier, gas
corporation/ electrical corporation/ wholesale electrical
cooperative/ telephone corporation/ telegraph corporation/ water
corporation/ sewerage corporation, heat corporation/ independent
energy producer not described in Subsection (e) f and the warehouseman where the service is performed for, or the commodity
delivered tof the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity
is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state
for domestic/ commercial/ or industrial use.
(30) "Telephone corporation" includes every corporation and
personf their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any telephone line for public
service within this state, provided, however, that all corporations, partnerships, or firms providing intrastate cellular
telephone service shall cease to be "telephone corporations" nine
months after both the wire-line and the nonwire-line cellular
service providers have been issued covering licenses by the
Federal Communications Commission. It does not include any person which provides, on a resale basis, any telephone or telecommunication service which is purchased from a telephone
corporation.
(31) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles,
wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other real
estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled,
operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone whether that communication is had with or
without the use of transmission wires.

All statutes are set forth in this addendum as they appear in
the 1986 replacement volumes of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.

54-4-1.

General jurisdiction.

The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction
to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state, and
to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in
this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such oower and jurisdiction; provided,
however, that the department of transportation shall have jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the
Department of Transportation Act.
54-7-15•

Review or rehearing by commission — Application
Procedure — Prerequisite to court action.

—

Before any party, stockholder, bondholder, or other person
pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied
with an order or decision of the commission may commence legal
action, the aggrieved party or person shall first proceed as provided in this section.
(1) After any order or decision has been made by the
commission any party to the action or proceeding, or any
stockholder or bondholder or other party pecuniarily
interested in the public utility affected, may apply for
review or rehearing in respect to any matters determined in
said action or proceeding specified in the applciation. The
applicant shall make application to the commission for review
or rehearing within 20 days after the issuance date of the
order or decision. The application shall set forth specifically the grounds on which the applicant considers such decision or order to be unlawful. No applicant shall in any
court urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the application. Any application for review or rehearing made ten
days or more before the effective date of the order as to
which review or rehearing is sought shall be either granted
or denied before such effective date, or the order shall
stand suspended until the application is granted or denied.
Any application for review or rehearing made within less than
ten days before the effective date of the order as to which
review or rehearing is sought, and not granted within 20
days, may be taken by the party making the applciation to be
denied, unless the effective date of the order is extended
for the period of the pendency of the application. If any
application for review or rehearing is granted without a
suspension of the order involved, the commission shall forthwith proceed to dispose of the matter with all dispatch and
shall determine the same within 20 days after final submission, and, if such determination is not made within said
time, it may be take by any party to the review or rehearing
that the order involved is affirmed. An application for

review or rehearing shall not excuse any corporation or person from complying with and obeying any order or decision or
with any requirement of any order or decision of the commission therefore made, or operate in any manner to stay or
postpone the enforcement thereof, except as herein otherwise
provdied, and except in such cases and upon such terms as the
commission may by order direct.
(2) (a) The Commission upon receipt of an application
for review shall, after review, proceed to grant or deny
the application. If the application is granted, the
commmission shall review the entire record on matters
covered in the application and shall affirm, abrogate,
change, or modify the original order or decision as it
deems proper.
(b) If the application is for rehearing, the commission, after review of the entire record on matters
covered in the application, may either grant the application or determine that there is insufficient reason to
grant a rehearing, in which event, it shall deny the
application, but it may affirm, abrogate, change, or
modify its original order or decision as it deems
proper. If a rehearing is granted, the commission,
after rehearing and after considering all the facts
including those arising after the original order or
decision, shall affirm, abrogate, change, or modify its
original order or decision as it deems proper.
(c) Any order or decision which abrogates, changes
or modifies an original order or decision shall have the
same force and effect as an original order or decision,
but shall not affect any right or the enforcement of any
right arising from or by virtue of the original order or
decision unless so ordered by the commission.
54-7-16.

Certiorari — Findings conclusive —
jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

Exclusive

Within thirty days after the application for a rehearing is
denied, or, if the application is granted, within thirty days
after the rendition of the decision on rehearing, the applicant
or any party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such
order or decision rendered upon rehearing may apply to the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having
the lawfulness of the original order or decision, or the order or
decision on rehearing, inquired into and determined. Such writ
shall be made returnable not later than thirty days after the
date of the issuance thereof, and shall direct the commission to
certify its record in the case to the court. Immediately after
the service of the writ the commission shall cause notice of the
pendency of the writ to be served upon each party to the action

or proceeding in which the order or decision was rendered in the
manner provided by § 54-7-9. On the return day the cause shall
be heard by the Supreme Court, unless for good reason shown the
same is continued. No new or additional evidence may be introduced in the Supreme Court, but the cause shall be heard on the
record of the commission as certified by it. The review shall
not be extended further than to determine whether the commission
has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of
whether the order or decision under review violates any right of
the petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or of
the state of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate
facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission on
reasonableness and discrimination. The commission and each party
to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the
right to appear in the review proceedings. Upon the hearing the
Supreme Court shall enter judgment either affirming or setting
aside the order or decision of the commission. The provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure [Rules of Civil Procedure] relating
to writs of review shall so far as applicable and not in conflict
with the provisions of this chapter apply to proceedings instituted in the Supreme Court under the provisions of this section.
No court of this state (except the Supreme Court to the extent
herein specified) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse,
correct or annul any order or decision of the commission, or to
suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin,
restrain or interfere with the commission in the performance of
its official duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall
lie from the Supreme Court to the commission in all proper cases.
54-8b-l.

Short title.

This chapter is known as the "Public Telecommunications
Utility Law."
54-8b-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Commission" means the Public Service Commission.
(2) "Intrastate telecommuncations service" means any
telecommunications service in which the information transmitted
originates and terminates within the boundaries of this state.
(3) "Public telecommunications services" means the
transmission of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, messages, data, or other information of any nature by wire, radio,
lightwaves, or other electronmagnetic means offered to the public
generally.
(4) "Telecommunications corporation" means every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, receivers, trustees
appointed by any court, owning, controlling, operating, managing,
or reselling a public telecommunications service.

54-8b-3«

Commission jurisdiction over telecommunications —
Exemptions from title allowed - Hearings and findings
— Approval period•

(1) The commission is vested with power and jurisdiction to
partially or wholly exempt from any requirement of this title any
telecommunications corporation or public telecommunications service in this state.
(2) The Commission, on its own initiative or in response to
an application by a telecommunications corporation or a user of a
public telecommunications service, may, after public notice and
an opportunity for a hearing, make findings and issue an order
specifying its requirements, terms, and conditions exempting any
telecommunications corporation or any public telecommunications
service from any requirement of this title either for a specific
geographic area or in the entire state if the commission finds
that the telecommunications corporation or service is subject to
effective competition, that customers of the telecommunications
corporation or service have reasonably available alternatives,
and that the telecommunications corporation or service does not
serve a captive customer base, and if such exemption is in the
public interest of the citizens of the state. In determining
whether to exempt any telecommunications corporation or public
telecommunications service from any requirement of this title,
the commission shall consider all relevant factors including, but
not limited to: (a) the number of other providers offering similar services; (b) the intrastate market power and market share
within the state of Utah of the telecommunications corporation
requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate market power and
market share of other provides; (d) the existence of other providers to make functionally equivalent services readily available
at competitive rates, terms, and conditions; (e) the effect of
exemption on the regulated revenue requirements of the telecommunications corporation requesting an exemption; (f) the ease of
entry of other providers into the marketplace; (g) the overall
impact of exemption on the public interest; (h) the integrity of
all service providers in the proposed market; (i) the cost of
providing such service; (j) the economic impact on existing telecommunications corporations; and (k) whether competition will
promote the provision of adequate services at just and reasonable
rates.
(3) The commission shall approve or deny any application for
exemption under this section within 240 days, except that the
commission may by order defer action for an additional 30-day
period. If the commission has not acted on any application
within the permitted time period, the application shall be deemed
granted.

54-8b-9«

Commission's jurisidction under other provisions of
title not enlarged or reduced by chapter•

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to enlarge or
reduce the commission's jurisdiction over the services and entities for which jurisdiction is provided or excluded by other provisions of this title.
63-46a-l.

Short title*

This act is known as the "Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act."
63-46a-2*

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Agency" means each state board, commission, institution, department, division, officer, or other state government
entity other than the Legislature, its committees, the political
subdivisions of the state, or the courts, which is authorized or
required by law to make rules, adjudicate, grant or withhold
licenses, grant or withhold relief from legal obligations, or
perform other similar actions or duties delegated by law,
(2) "Bulletin" means the Utah State Bulletin.
(3) "Effective" means operative and enforceable.
(4) (a) "File" means to submit a document to the office as
prescribed by this chapter.
(b) "Filing date" means the day and time the document
is recorded as received by the office.
(5) "Office" means the Office of Administrative Rules, which
is under the supervision of the Department of Administrative
Services.
(6) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, governmental subdivision, or public or private organization of any character other than an agency.
(7) "Publication" means making a rule available to the public
by printing the rule or a summary of the rule in the bulletin.
"Publication date" means the inscribed date of the bulletin.
(8) (a) "Rule" means a statement made by an agency that
applies to a general class of persons, rather than specific
persons and: (i) implements or interprets policy made by
statute; or (ii) prescirbes the policy of the agency in the
absence of express stautory policy; or (iii) prescribes the
administration of the agency's functions or describes its
organization, procedures, and operations. "Rule" includes
the amendment or repeal of an existing rule.
(b) "Rule" does not include: (i) statements concerning
only the internal management of an agency and which do not
affect private persons as a class, other agencies, or other
governmental entities; (ii) declaratory rulings pursuant to §
63-46a-14; or (iii) executive orders.

63-46a-13«

Declaratory judgment to determine validity of rule#

(1) The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined
in an action for declaratory judgment in any district court of
this state with appropriate venue, if it is alleged that the
rule, or its potential application, interferes with or impairs,
or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or
privileges of the plaintiff.
(2) In an action for declaratory judgment on a rule, the
agency shall be made a party to the action.
(3) A declaratory judgment by a court may be rendered
whether or not the plaintiff has requested the agency to pass
upon the applicability of the rule in question. However, the
issue of applicability may not be determined by the district
court while the issue is under consideration by the agency during
any proceeding pending before that agency or during the time the
agency's decision concerning applicability is subject to appeal
or being considered on appeal.
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The parties thereaf-
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of 2:00 p.m., before A. Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge
for the Commission.
Administrative

Evidence was offered and received, and the

Law Judge, having

considered

the same, together

with the briefs submitted, new enters the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order based thereon.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Page America

of Utah, Inc., hereafter

called

"Appli-

cant" is a corporation organized and existing under the lavs of
the State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City,
Utah.
company

It is a subsidiary of Page America Group, Inc., a holding
with

nationwide.
Paging,

operating

companies

Applicant's

Inc.,

appearing

in

position
as

amicus

a
is

large

number

supported

curiae,

of

by

hereafter

states

American
called

"American," a corporation qualified to do business in the state
of Utah, and which is already operating a paging service, though
without certification

from this Commission.

opposed

Williams,

by

David

R.

dba

The application is

Industrial

Communications,

hereafter called "Industrial", and by Mobile Telephone, Inc., a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of
Utah, hereafter called "MTI".

The Division of Public Utilities

also epposes the present motion of the Applicant
certificate, and instead asks the Commission

for an exempt

to exercise limited

regulatory oversight of pacing service, similar to that which we
exercise over WATS resellers.
2.

Both of the protestants currently hold certificates of

convenience and necessity from this Commission

authorizing them
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to prcvide mobile radio-telephone service in various parts cf the
state, and in conjunction therewith to operate paging service as
well.

The grants of authority have been nade at various times,

and with

a single

exception

have

provided

for

operate both mobile telephone and paging service.

authority

to

In 1974, the

Commission issued a certificate to Mobile Telephone Service of
Southern Utah, Inc. (which corporation

is not a Protestant in

this case) in Case Mo. 6969 which dealt exclusively with the
provision cf paging service, and the Protestants cite that case
to

the

Commission

already decided

as

determmitive

that

the

the jurisdictional issue herein.

Commission

has

In one case, to

be discussed hereafter, the Commission did assert jurisdiction
over such service, but that case was reversed by the Utah Supreme
Court, and in view cf the Court's disposition of the same, we do
not consider ourselves bound by it.
ter, we do net believe

that

As we will discuss hereaf-

the Supreme Court

has

ruled in

respect to the Commission's jurisdiction ever caging services.
3.

Paging technology has been developing extremely rapidly

over the past ten to fifteen years.
tially

the only method

people

Prior to that time, substan-

had

of

ensuring

that

they be

apprised of all calls when they were away from the phone, was to
employ an answering service.
message

with

the

answering

The calling party would leave a
service,

to

be

relayed

when

the

customer of the answering service phoned in to get the messages.
There was no way to let the customer know immediately when a
message had been left.

C^SZ NO. 93-082-01
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The

"beeper".

first

electronic

improvement

was

a

tone-only

This was an electronic device which could be activated

by a radio signal from the answering service providing a highpitch tone to alert the customer that a message was waiting. The
most primitive form of this system involves a human activating
the beeper and giving the customer a message when the customer
phones in*

In almost all cases this primitive system has been

superseded by a machine which automatically activates the beeper
and then plays back the caller's message when the customer phones
in.
5.

The next advance in technology was to provide "tone-two

address" service which would enable a customer, by the type of
the tone, to discern which of two numbers to call to get messages.

This type of service has in turn been superseded by "tone

and voice" service, which allows a person to hear the messace
after the beeper is activated, thus sparing

the necessity of

phoning in to get messages.

New en the horizon are two further

advances in the technology:

digital display (already available)

which will display the message in numeric form, obviously in most
cases directing the customer which telephone number to call tc
reach the caller.

Digital display is already available in many

parts of the country and has very recently been introduced in the
Salt Lake market.

It is likely to be superseded quite scon by an

"alpha-numeric" display which will enable the customer to receive
a short written message as well as numeric data.
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6.

It

is

new

foreseeable

that

in

the

near

future

the

alpha-numeric display will enable the customer to use the services of a "network," which will link him to data bases, and will
enable

him

to use

his

service

nationwide.

The Applicant

American are each involved in establishing such a network.

and
!icr.e

of the existing certificated carriers in Utah have taken concrete
steps in such a direction.
7,

Despite the rapid advances in the technology, and the

potential for greater usefulness, the essential structure of the
service remains the same.

A caller uses the telephone system to

reach the service and leave a message.

The message

is stored.

There is then a retransmission, either to alert the customer that
there is a message, or to send it directly for voice or display.
The retransmission may or may not involve use of the land lines.
The service requires, by way of equipment, some means of answering

the

calls,

storing

the

messages,

transmitting

signal, and replaying the stored message.
must

be done

signal.

electronically

Obviously, a manual system

operation would
equipment
time.

is the

be

to handle

intolerably

the

alert

The only part which

transmission

of

the

alert

for the other part of the

cumbersome,

these aspects has been

and hence

automated

available

for seme

Although this renders the establishment of such a system

expensive, nevertheless, if one compares the capital of such an
operation with that required for a land line telephone system, or
similar fixed utility, they are relatively modest.

Furthermore,

the operation of such a system dees not involve the installation
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system.
8.

The Federal Communications

located

two primary bands

Commission

for paging

service.

known as the "high band," lies around 900 MHz.
around 35 and 43 MHz.

(FCC) has alOne, commonly
"Low band" lies

The FCC has recently allocated 63 addi-

tional channels for the "high band" and 28 channels in the "low
band".

Between them, the two bands have had only eight channels

heretofore.

The

FCC

has

also

considerably

liberalized

its

criteria for granting new licenses on these bands.
9.

In the wake of the FCC allocation of additional chan-

nels , and relaxation of licensing requirements, there has been a
perceptible trend in a number of states toward relaxing regulation of paging services, or deregulating them altogether.
10.

At present, the Applicant's subsidiaries in a number of

otner states are offering tone and voice paging, digital paging,
and m

sore cases alpha-numeric paging.

They propose to offer

all forms immediately, should they be granted authority, with the
possible exception of alpha-numeric, which may be delayed slightly for technical reasons.

They also propose to offer networx

paging as soon as it is available.

American offers the same

present capabilities, and proposes the same future service.
presently offers ail forms except alpna-numeric.

MTI

MTI has begun

investigating possible network affiliation, but has no concrete
plans at present.
and

voice.

It

Industrial can presently offer tone, and tone
has

the

technical

capabilities

of

offering

CASE NO. 9 3-082-01
- 7digital, but at present has no frequencies available to it for
that purpose.

It expects they will be available, and it proposes

to offer such service as soon as it is possible.
CQNCLUSICNS OF LAW
1.

The issue

turns upon the construction

of Utah Cede

Annotated 54-2-1 (22) , which gives regulatory jurisdiction to the
Commission over telephone corporations as defined

therein.

An

integral part of that definition incorporates a separate definition of a •telephone line" which U.C.A. 54-2-1 (21) defines to be
"all conduits, ducts, coles, wires, cables,
instruments and appliances, and all other
reai estate and fixtures and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in
connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone whetner such communication
is had with or without the use of transmission wires."
2.

Because

the Utan statute uses the terms

"facilitate

communication by telephone whether such communication is had with
or without the use of transmission wires," it simply is not clear
that the Legislature

specifically

intended

to include one-way

paging service within the regulatory 3urisdicticn of this Commission.

In construing

its

jurisdiction

as

a matter

of

first

impression, the Commission first considers the plain meaning of
the underlying statute.

Where the statute is ambiguous, as here,

we examine the decisions of courts for guidance in construing the
law; and where reasonably direct guidance is lacking in authoritative case law, we endeavor to apply a prudent judgment grounded in our regulatory experience which takes

into account the

CASE NO. 93-03:-<n
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and economic bases for affording

certain enter-

prises the unique status of regulated monopolies, as well as
considerations of public interest in receiving necessary utility
service.

The parties in this matter have referred the Commission

to many cases from our own and other states, some of which have
opted for a regulatory plan for paging service, and some whicn
have not*

The weight of case authority is split, and we ars

persuaded by our review of Utah cases that the Utah Supreme Court
has never

squarely addressed the Commission's jurisdiction over

paging service,
3.
case

In the 1974 Mobile Telecncne Service of Souther** Utah

(No* 6969) , the Commission granted a paging certificate;

however, two facts are significant with respect to that decision.
First, the application does not appear to have been contested,
and therefore the issue of jurisdiction was not argued before the
Commission m

an adversarial context. Second, the Commission made

no findings nor conclusions from which it may be inferred that
the issue of jurisdiction was ever fully considered,

and for

whatever reason, the Commission failed to declare that it had
jurisdiction to issue the certificate.

We conclude as a ratter

of law that the Commission had no such jurisdiction, and that the
order in that case was null and void.
the inclusion of paging service m

We further conclude that

any certificates issued by the

Commission, authorizing the holders to provide rrcbile telephone
service, was error, and that the portions of orders conferring
authority to provide paging service are null and void.
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Protestants

refer

to

the

Corliss ion' s Order

In

t.ue

Matter of the Investigation

of the Practices and Operations of

Medic-Call,

Harold

a

corporation,

Jensen,

M.D.,

Professional

Exchance Answering Service and Industrial Communications Ccrcany,
Investigation Docket No, 120

(1969), in support of the proposi-

tion that this Ccrnmission has already squarely faced and decided
the issue of its jurisdiction over paging services.
we see it, the debate m

However, as

that proceeding was over the question of

whether or not Medic-Call was offering its service to the public
generally, whereas, in the instant proceeding the debate is over
different
service

questions, one

is a telephone

statutes.

of which
corporation

is whether
within

or

the

not

a pacing

meaning

of

our

We note that in Medic-Call v. Public Service Commis-

sion, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 P.2d 253 (1970), which is the appeal of
the Commission's Crder in Investigation Docket No. 120, the Court
in its opinion merely assumes arguendo that a paging service is a
telephone corporation:

here we cannot so assume.

It is also worthwnile to note the rather stinging dicta of
the Court in Medic-Call;
"The service (caging service) is comparable to that wnicn would be rendered by
runners or call boys to notify doctors that
they were wanted on the phone. One wonders
3ust how the defendant would go about regulating the service even if it had the power
to do so.
If defendants can regulate the
service rendered by plaintiffs herein, could
they not with equal propriety regulate the
semaphore signaling of the Boy Scouts or the
smc.Ke signals of the Indians on a hunting
expedition?"
(at page 260, 470 P.2d)
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cite

the

opinion

of

the

Supreme

Court

in

Williams v. Hvrun Gibbons & Sens Co., 602 P.2d 634 (1979), to
demonstrate that the term "telephone line" includes the plant,
equipment and facilities used to provide paging

services.

In

Williams the Court construed the meaning of "telephone line" but
did so by stating only that the phrase included "radio-telephone
communications,"

The Williams case presented the issue to the

Court in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, and the
question of whether plaintiff had condemnation powers required a
finding that the plaintiff was in fact a public utility.
business

of the plaintiff

for which

eminent

domain

The

had been

sought was to install a transmitter to operate radio telephone
and paging service.

The Court didn't specify that paging is to

be treated within the definition of a "telephone line" but relied
more generally

on

within the broad

"radio-telecnone
definition

mission wires") without
radio-telephone

communications"

as failing

("whether with or without trans-

identifying

communications.

services which

Clearly,

mobile

constitute
telephone

service is within the meaning of the statute, and the case can be
said to stand for that; however, we conclude that the nature of
pacing sen/ice is so fundamentally distinct and different from
mobile telephone service that the Court's language in that case
falls short of declaring paging to be a telephone line.
We read the fleeting references to paging service m

the

cases to mean that paging has been a distinctly separate service
which

companies

have offered

adjunctively
B-10

to their

customers
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- 11 because

the

service

can

technologically

dovetail

with mcbil*

telephone service? but the two are net the sane in fact, nor
should they be treated the same in law.
5.

The distinction between paging and telephone service is

critical because if in defining "telephone line11 one focuses on
the phrase

"facilitate

telephone communication,"

the scope of

potentially regulated services becomes staggering.

Conceivably

the Commission should then regulate all suppliers of telephone
equipment,
suppliers

e.g.
of

Radio

wiring

directories, including

Shack,

Sears,

components;

all

J.C.Penney,
suppliers

of

the many not affiliated with

Panasonic?
telephone
the Bell

system; telephone answering services, telephone answering devices
and all such suppliers; radio talk stations; newspaper classified
advertising, jad absurdum.

The focus instead should be on the

connotation of telephone service which implies interactive, and
at least potentially extended two-way communication.

That was

certainly the focus in 1917 when the statute was enacted, since
most

of

the

services

foreseen at that time.

new

technologically

feasible

were

not

Paging service is conceptually no differ-

ent from answering services

(which have never been considered

appropriate objects cf state regulation); it is the same service
offered through a different medium.

Telephone service over land

lines or radio waves is fundamentally the same service irrespective of the means of transmission.

But telephone service is a

two-way service; paging service is one-way call notificaticn.

B-ll
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6.

Finally, we consider

service

in the context

have warranted
ically,

of the

granting

legislatures

it appropriate
traditional

to evaluate

characteristics

of a state-regulated

have

narrowly

paging

monopoly.

circumscribed

the

which

Histor-

conditions

which justify such a departure from a free market economy.
conditions
which

is

have

generally

included

deemed

necessary

and

existence

of

natural

the

providing

essential

monopolies

to

because

of

the

of

Those

a

service

citizenry,

significant

the

capital

investment necessary to achieve economies of scale in production,
and the efficient use of minimally
land.

An

objective

analysis

of

intrusive rights of way across
paging

service

persuades

us

to

conclude the following:
(a)
growing
the

Paging
number

effect

of

but

a

valuable

people.

that

subscribers,
ers.

is

it

has

Industrial
the

presently

While paging

convenience

capacity

serves

natural

public

gas

basic

the

number

of

to

200,000

serve

telephone

telephone

that

service

to

paging

subscrib-

in aiding

water,

are

it be

customers

2,500

but

instant

say that the service is a

sense

of the citizenry, nor can

well-being
cant

and

in

small

information

is beneficial and efficient

service

a

presented

approximately

response to telephone calls, we cannot
necessary

for

avail

electricity,

necessary

said

to

the

that a signifi-

themselves

of

the

service.
(b)

The capital necessary

substantial

compared

to provide paging

tc the capital

utility services.
B-12

commitments

service is net
common

to other
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The

transmission
nienced

public

is

of paging

by

inconvenienced

signals

unlimited

rights of way.

not

in

electric

Whether

the way

the

plant

or

it would

be

seeking

transmission

companies

there are

by

inconve-

three or three hundred

paging

companies, the intrusion upon land would be minimal.
(d)
the

Paging may have been a service in short supply

FCC

imposed

severe

limits

to

market

entry

by

because

restricting

frequencies within the RF spectrum; however, the FCC decision to
release

96

new

frequencies

significantly

alters

the

supply

consideration and represents a major federal policy to liberalize
market access and fester competition in the paging
(e)
to

If competition

paging

reason

customers,

can

there

for this Commission

there would

produce

be obvious

would

service

appear

to exercise

advantages

to

to

industry.

and

price

be

no

substantial

jurisdiction.

the

benefits

Protestants

Certainly
if

marker

entry were restricted, but the purpose of state regulation
to

protect

sake;
will

the

interests

it is to protect
be

many

market

of

regulated

the public

entrants,

flourish and some will

fail.

and

companies

interest.
it

is

for

isn't

their

Conceivably,

likely

that

We see no significant

there

seme

risk

own

will

to

the

public if some providers fail, and we are persuaded that the open
market will in time be the best safeguard of the public

interest,

both in terms of price and service.
(f)
tion

The Protestants urge the Commission to assert jurisdic-

to preclude

duplication

the essence of competition,

of

and

facilities,

but

duplication

such a policy would
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is
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vastly greater than it is.
7.

The issues raised

herein demonstrate

that

it

is an

appropriate time to request that our Legislature modernize the
definition cf telephone service.

The questions in this case, as

well as the the Ccmmission's decision to assert limited regulatory oversight of WATS

resellers, and the restructuring

of the

telephone industry incident to the break-up of the Bell System
merit a careful evaluation of what ought to be regulated and what
cannot be regulated in order to better serve the communication
requirements of Utahns.

We are attempting to crunch the tech-

nology of 1983 into the terminology cf 1917, and there are too
many technological and economic developments to make ambiguous
definitions advisable or workable.
Accordingly, we make the following Order:
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the application
of Page America of Utah, Inc. be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Telephone,
insofar

Inc., Certificate
as

the

same

No.

purports

1414

issued

to grant

in Case

authority

service be, and the same hereby is, hereby amended

No. 5169,
for

paging

to delete

therefrom any reference to paging service, and that: a copy cf
this Order be filed and made effective in said case; and
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- 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity No, 1504 issued in Case No. 5482 to David R. Williams,
dba

Industrial

amended

to

Communications,

delete

therefrom

be,
any

and

the

reference

same
to

hereby

mobile

is,

paging

service? and that a copy of this Order be filed and made effective in said case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Telephone Service of Southern Utah Inc., Certificate No. 1856 issued
in Case No. 6969, insofar as the same grants authority for paging
service, is hereby voided, and that a copy of this Order be filed
and made effective m

said case.

DATED at Salt La*e City, Utah, this 28th day of November,
1983.

/s/ A. Robert Thurran,
Administrative law Jucre
Approved and confirmed this 28th day of November, 1982, as
the Report and Order of the Commission.
/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
(SEAL)

I si

David R. Ir^'ine » Ccmmissicrer

/s/ James M. 3vrne, Commissioner
ru

ir •

Attest:
/s/ Gecrcia 2. Petersen, Secretarv
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ADDENDUM D

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH In the Matter of the Applica)
tion Of AMERICAN PAGING, INC. )
(OF UTAHi for a Certificate of )
Convenience and Necessity to
)
Operate as a Public Utility
)
Rendering Paging Service to the )
General Public in Areas of Box )
Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis,
)
Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch)
and Tooele Counties, Utah.
)

CASE NO. 85-2007-01
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS

ISSUED: May 23, 1986
By the Commission:
On or about August 10, 1983, Page America Inc. filed an
application with the Commission to provide one-way paging service.

On November 28, 1983, however, the Commission ruled that

it had no statutory jurisdiction over paging services.

The case

was subsequently appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.
On or about April 30, 1985 American Paging Inc. (American Paging) filed an application with the Commission to provide
one-way paging service to the general public between points in
Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch
and Tooele Counties within that area.

American Paging filed

simultaneously a Motion to Dismiss its Application for the reason
that the Commission, in its Order of November 28, 1983, had
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way
paging services.

American Paging also stated that although the

1985 Utah Legislature amended the Public Utilities Act by adding
Chapter 8b. empowering the Commission to wholly or partially
exempt certain competitive telecommunication services or service
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providers, said chapter did not expand the Commission's jurisdiction beyond that which it already had.
On or about March 4, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the Commission's deregulation of one-way paging was defective

because

the

Commission

had

attempted

the

deregulation

through an Order construing its jurisdiction rather than through
rulemaking under the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Thereafter, in accord with

the

instruction

of

the

Supreme Court, the Commission filed a notice of proposed rulemaking with the Office of Administrative Rules on April 15, 1986,
which stated that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over
one-way paging and the reasons for it.
the parties.

Notice was provided to

No party requested a hearing within the 15-day

period following publication as required by the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

The rule was formally adopted and made

effective May 16, 1986.
The Commission further concludes from the comments and
oral arguments of the parties that Chapter 8B of the Public
Utilities Act of the Utah Code does not expand the jurisdiction
of the Commission to include one-way paging.
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the
following:
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Commission, having issued a rule pursuant to the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act and in accord with the direction of the Utah
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- 3 Supreme Court that it does not have jurisdiction over one-way
paging services and having further determined that Chapter 8B of
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the
Commission to include one-way paging, hereby grants American
Paging's Motion to Dismiss its Application for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity to provide one-way paging services.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this ?3rd day of May,
1986.

I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
(SEAL)

Is/

James M. Byrne, Commissioner

I si Brian T. Stewart, Commissioner
Attest:
I si Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary

